It is perhaps all too easy to stereotype certain states in
the E.U. as “Euroskeptic.” To be sure, the polls in Britain provide ample
support for this label. Even in that case, however, a majority polled in 2012
was in favor of remaining in the Union. The question is perhaps whether Britain
is an outlier in terms of the extent of public dissatisfaction with the E.U.
nevertheless.
When Poland had a conservative government, it was easy to
view that state as being in the “Euroskeptic” camp. Then a change of government
brought the state firmly in support of Angela Merkel’s pro-integrationist
position. Similarly, the Czech Republic under Vaclav Klaus resisted any further
transfer of governmental sovereignty to the European Union. Klaus was a “state’s
rights” man if there ever was one. Then Milos Zeman because president of the
Czechs. Suddenly the prospect was for a Czech push for more integration.
“I very much believe that though the future development will
not be smooth, I’m convinced that it will lead to greater integration, sooner
or later, and therefore a president who believes that we should be part of the
hardcore of integrated, democratic Europe, is for me a signal that the danger
that we would finish on some kind of periphery of our own continent is now gone
forever,” Jan Kavan, a former foreign minister said following the election. According
to Deutsche Welle, “Milos Zeman is certainly more pro-European than his
predecessor Vaclav Klaus, who never missed an opportunity to attack the pace
and direction of European integration.” Was the remarkable shift present in the
Czech people, or is it more accurate to say that a party rather than a people is
“Euroskeptic”?
Even in Britain, Tony Blair was much more pro-E.U. than
David Cameron. Although it is possible that a shift occurred in the British
people against the E.U. due to the risks in the debt crisis and the E.U.’s
muted or gradual response, the shift of party in power probably explains more
of the recognition that the British had become “Euroskeptic.”
If “pro-Europe” and “Euroskeptic” stances are partisan at
the state level rather than characterizing a state as a whole, then we could
expect state politics to bear heavily on a state government’s position on
particular proposals bearing on the European Union. This is suboptimal from the
perspective of Europe as a whole, for what may be the optimal partisan stance
is not necessarily in the best interest of the Union. Furthermore, the sense
that there are certain “Euroskeptic” states may be an overstatement needlessly
holding back European integration. In other words, the opposition to
transferring more governmental sovereignty to the federal level may not be as
formidable or as permanent as one might conclude.
Poland and the Czech Republic “shifting” over to the integrationist
camp in Europe raises the possibility that Britain may be increasingly isolated
for as long as the parties in power
retain their position. Indeed, even the perception of Britain being
isolated in the E.U. may be a function of David Cameron’s party being in power.
This is not to say that there are not plenty of Europeans with a negative view
of the European Union. Even so, it might be erroneous to label certain states “Euroskeptic”
and assume that their respective governments will permanently veto additional
competencies proposed for the Union at the expense of the state governments
(but in their long-term best interest of peace and prosperity in place of
nationalist war). The future for Europe might be brighter than momentary appearances
may lead us to suppose.
Source:
“New
Czech President No Stranger to Controversy,” Deutsche Welle, 29 January 2013
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